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The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History
in Light of Runyon v. McCrary
Robert J. Kaczorowskit
Surely we have the authority to enact a law as efficient in the inter-
est of freedom, now that freedom prevails throughout the country, as
we had in the interest of slavery when it prevailed in a portion of the
country.'
This brief statement in support of the Civil Rights Act of 18662 by its
author, Senator Lyman Trumbull, reveals the two most important issues
confronting the bill's supporters: whether Congress possessed any author-
ity to protect and enforce civil rights, and what were the most effective
means of securing civil rights in light of contemporary legal doctrine and
the nature of the civil rights violations that compelled the statute's framers
to legislate. Senator Trumbull's reference to the Fugitive Slave Acts of
17931 and 1850 also suggests one of the bitter ironies of the statute's
history, for they served as legislative models of congressional enforcement
of a constitutional provision securing a fundamental right of United States
citizenship, the property right of slaveholders in their slaves. Moreover,
the constitutional provision these statutes were enacted to implement, the
fugitive slave clause,5 as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
provided the framers of the Civil Rights Act with a theory of constitu-
tional delegation of plenary congressional authority to secure fundamental
rights which they invoked in their efforts to enforce civil rights.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the history of the enact-
ment and early enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from the
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perspective of the remedies Congress sought to provide to meet the
problems that necessitated the legislation. Its main foci are the statute's
enforcement provisions and their early implementation, an aspect of the
history of the statute that has not been fully considered in relation to sec-
tion one, the provision that has received the most scholarly attention.' The
occasion of this study is the Supreme Court's reconsideration of Runyon
v. McCrary' in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.8 The specific ques-
tion the Court will decide is whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 pro-
vides remedies for private acts of racial discrimination which violate the
right to contract secured by section one of the statute. Runyon held that it
does. The Court will decide whether to restrict the scope of the Civil
Rights Act to discriminatory state action. The basis of the Court's recon-
sideration appears to be a question of legislative intent: whether the fram-
ers intended the statute to protect civil rights from discriminatory state
action alone, or from private discrimination as well. This Comment con-
cludes that, if the intent of the legislative framers and the interpretation
given the statute by the federal judges and legal officers who were charged
with enforcing it on its enactment are dispositive, then Runyon was cor-
rectly decided.
This history will show that interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as limited to state action are anachronistic and historically incorrect
because the framers did not intend, and probably could not have intended,
to legislate within a concept of state action.9 This conclusion follows from
the constitutional and legal doctrines within which the framers legislated
in 1866 to enforce civil rights, from the nature of the civil rights violations
which confronted them, and from the remedies they provided in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to enforce civil rights directly in the federal courts.
-This Comment will explain the constitutional doctrines of American fed-
eralism-known as dual sovereignty-state sovereign immunity, and the
general rules of equity relating to injunctions, the remedy Congress would
have had in mind if it had intended to protect against discriminatory state
action as we understand the doctrine today.
This explanation will show that in 1866 legal doctrine restricted Con-
gress to enforcing rights against private individuals. Congress did not have
6. The most comprehensive and systematic study of civil rights enforcement during reconstruction
was published only recently. R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866,1876 (1985).
7. 427 U.S. 160 (1975).
8. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (ordering reargument).
9. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192-214 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 449-80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress,
Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 Am. HisT. REV. 45 (1987) [hereinafter To
Begin the Nation Anew]; Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368, 370-71 (1973) [hereinafter Searching for Intent]; Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 863, 869 n.19 (1986) [hereinafter Revolutionary Constitutionalism].
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authority directly to enforce rights against the states. Rather than exclud-
ing private individuals, Congress expanded the scope of civil rights by
adding state officials within its provisions. Moreover, Congress could en-
force only rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and it could provide for their enforcement only in federal courts.
Congress had no authority to compel state officials to enforce federal
rights or to perform federal duties. Nor did Congress have authority to
enforce rights conferred by the states or to interfere with state enforcement
of any rights, whether secured by the Constitution or conferred by the
states.
Moreover, Congress could not enforce even federal rights directly
against state officials because the officials were immune from civil suit.
Even apart from sovereign immunity, the equitable rules relating to the
remedy of injunction would have barred its use as a means of restraining
state officials from enforcing discriminatory state laws and from the dis-
criminatory administration of impartial laws. Constitutional doctrines and
legal rules in 1866 would not have provided the framers with the notion
of a state action limitation on Congress' authority to enforce civil rights.
Nor would they have suggested to the framers the dichotomy between
state action and private action. These doctrines and rules as the framers
understood and used them in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 point
to one conclusion: that the framers intended to exercise plenary authority
to enforce civil rights by conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to
give direct relief to victims of civil rights violations.
I. THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS' UNDERSTANDING OF ITS POWER
TO ENFORCE CIVIL RIGHTS
The controversial issue that confronted Congress in its efforts to secure
civil rights in 1866 was not whether national civil rights enforcement
should extend to private individuals or be limited to eliminating discrimi-
natory state laws, but whether Congress had any authority to secure civil
rights in any manner at all. Since the states had been the traditional
guardians of fundamental rights, Republicans had to find an explicit or an
implied constitutional delegation of authority to secure such rights before
Congress could legislate to protect and enforce the civil rights of
Americans.
Congressional proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 found consti-
tutional authorization to enforce civil rights in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. As the quotation at
the beginning of this Comment indicates, the framers insisted that this
Amendment delegated to Congress as much authority to secure the free-
dom established by its abolition of slavery as Congress previously had pos-
sessed to secure the property right of slaveholders in their slaves. The
1989]
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framers specifically relied on the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the constitutional provision that secured the personal property
right of slaveholders in their slaves as authority for their view of Con-
gress' plenary power to secure the personal rights of the slaves emanci-
pated by the Thirteenth Amendment. This constitutional provision was
the fugitive slave clause:
No person held to Service or Labour in one State under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour; but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due."0
The United States Supreme Court declared in 1842 that it should inter-
pret this provision "in such a manner, as, consistently with the words,
shall fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it."" In an opin-
ion written by Justice Joseph Story, the Court acknowledged that this
clause was a negative prohibition on the states, but nonetheless held that
this "clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unquali-
fied right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or
regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain."' 2 The
clause also "implies a guaranty-and a duty," namely, a duty to permit
slaveowners to use the courts as a guaranty of the property right. 13 Story
concluded that, "If, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right, and if it
requires the delivery upon the claim of the owner (as cannot well be
doubted), the natural inference certainly is, that the national government
is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it.' 4
Story then wrote a passage that was quoted in Congress by the Chair-
man and a member of the House Judiciary Committee in support of Con-
gress' authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In this passage
Justice Story laid down several principles of constitutional interpretation:
that the constitutional recognition of a right delegated to Congress plenary
authority to enforce it; that the states could not be compelled to enforce
the constitutional right; and that the constitutional recognition of the right
imposed on the national government the sole duty and conferred plenary
authority to enforce it:
The fundamental principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would
seem to be, that where the end is required, the means are given; and
where the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
11. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 614.
14. Id. at 615.
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to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is entrusted. The
clause is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any
state. It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action
to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be
compelled to enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconsti-
tutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that the
states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of
the national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by
the Constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the necessary
conclusion is, that the national government, in the absence of all pos-
itive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper
departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may re-
quire, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it
by the Constitution. 5
The concurring and dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Taney and Jus-
tices Thompson, Wayne, Daniel, and McLean all affirmed the holding
that the constitutional prohibition against state interference with the ren-
dering up of fugitive slaves recognized and secured an affirmative prop-
erty right of the slaveholder in his slaves, and that this delegated to Con-
gress plenary if not exclusive authority to protect and enforce the property
right directly and independently of the states against private individuals,
notwithstanding state laws to the contrary. 6 The Court consistently af-
firmed its interpretation of this constitutional provision.17
The framers' theory of the Thirteenth Amendment was much broader
than the "badges of slavery" concept expressed by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1968.1 Since they understood the original Constitution to
delegate to Congress plenary authority to enforce the master's absolute
personal right of property in his slave, the framers interpreted the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a delegation of plenary authority to enforce the
freedmen's absolute rights as free men. Imbued with the Hamiltonian
conception of constitutional interpretation that was expressed by the Su-
preme Court under Chief Justices John Marshall and Roger Taney in
cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland and Prigg v. Pennsylvania,9 the
framers, relying on those cases,2" interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment's
15. Id. at 615-16 (quoted in CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1294 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1836
(Rep. Lawrence)).
16. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. at 626-33 (Taney, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 634
(Thompson, J., concurring); id. at 636, 638, 643, 645-47 (Wayne, J., concurring), id. at 651 (Daniel,
J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 661 (McLean, J., concurring and dissenting).
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451-52 (1856); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 13, 17-19 (1852); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 225, 229-30 (1847); see
also Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 338-39 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583).
18. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
19. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539 (1842).
20. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1118, 1294 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1836 (Rep.
Williams).
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negative prohibition of slavery as an affirmative guarantee of liberty to all
Americans. Thus, when Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced his Civil
Rights Bill to the Senate, he explained that in abolishing slavery, the
Thirteenth Amendment "declared that all persons in the United States
should be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that declaration
and secure to all persons within the United States practical freedom. '21
Trumbull and other Republicans in both Houses of Congress interpreted
the liberty guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment as the status and
fundamental rights of freemen, the rights to life, liberty, and property and
all the rights that follow from these.22 They equated this status and these
rights with the status and rights of United States citizenship. 2 Although
Republicans believed that an exact enumeration of the specific rights inci-
dent to the generic rights to life, liberty, and property was impossible,24
they did enumerate some of these specific rights in section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The rights they specified mirrored the civil rights
deprivations they were trying to remedy: the economic rights to contract
and to property, the means necessary to enforce these rights in the courts,
and the right to governmental protection of persons and property. The
enumeration of these rights was not only a direct response to conditions in
the South, it was also an expression of the framers' understanding of the
rights essential to political and economic freedom and individual auton-
omy. Because the framers believed that the Constitution and, with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, the laws of the United States secured to
Americans the status and fundamental rights of free men as the status and
rights of United States citizenship, the framers understood United States
citizenship to be primary and state citizenship to be subordinate to and
derivative of United States citizenship.25
The consequences of this constitutional theory on American federalism
were revolutionary. 28 The framers were claiming that Congress possessed
21. Id. at 474 (Sen. Trumbull).
22. See, e.g., id. at 1780-81 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 503-04 (Sen. Howard); id. at 570 (Sen.
Morrill); id. at 602, 741 (Sen. Lane); id. at 1255 (Sen. Wilson); id. at app. 101 (Sen. Yates); id. at
1118 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1151-52 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1833 (Rep.
Lawrence). For additional authority in and out of Congress, see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Consti-
tutionalism, supra note 9, at 898-99 n.156.
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1293 (Rep. Shellabarger). Indeed, Congressman Bingham
understood the Civil Rights Bill as a guarantee of the Bill of Rights. It is because the Supreme Court
had interpreted the Bill of Rights as restrictions on the power of the national government and not as
delegations of authority that Bingham believed that a constitutional amendment delegating this au-
thority to Congress was necessary before Congress constitutionally could enact a law such as the Civil
Rights Act. Id. at 1291. His stated purpose in drafting and proposing the resolution that became the
Fourteenth Amendment was to arm Congress with the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights. Id. at
1033, 1088-94, 1291.
25. Id. at 1756 (Sen. Trumbull). Some of the supporters expressed the belief that the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution also authorized Congress to secure the fundamen-
tal rights to life, liberty, and property. Id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1294 (Rep. Wilson); id. at
1833 (Rep. Lawrence).
26. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 916; Kaczorowski, To Begin
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plenary authority to secure the civil rights of all Americans as rights of
United States citizenship. They freely asserted their intention to enforce
the rights of white and black Americans.27 They distinguished these rights
from state-conferred rights with which they insisted they had no intention
of interfering because, under the doctrine of dual sovereignty in 1866,
these rights were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. The fram-
ers identified as state-conferred rights such privileges as the right to attend
public schools, to public accommodations, to transportation, to marry, to
vote in state and local elections, and to hold state and local offices.2" Con-
sequently, when the framers denied that the Civil Rights Act would inter-
fere with these rights, it was precisely because they regarded these rights
as state-enforced rights of state citizenship beyond Congress' legislative
authority.29 The framers' theory of citizenship and civil rights, therefore,
was inconsistent with the doctrine of state action since state action as-
sumes that the framers intended only to secure an equality in state-
conferred rights. The Democratic opposition understood the revolutionary
consequences of the Republican theory of citizenship and congressional
civil rights enforcement authority under the Thirteenth Amendment and
warned that "The principles involved in this bill, if they are legitimate
and constitutional, would authorize Congress to pass civil and criminal
codes for every State of the Union."3 0 The constitutional doctrine "would
wholly absorb all reserved State sovereignty and rights."31 If the status
and fundamental rights of freemen were secured to Americans by the
Constitution and laws of the United States through United States citizen-
ship, as congressional Republicans insisted, then Congress did indeed pos-
sess plenary and therefore potentially exclusive authority over civil rights
and could supplant legislatively state civil and criminal codes.
The framers of the Civil Rights Act expressly intended to exercise ple-
nary authority and to displace state law to the extent necessary to enforce
the absolute rights of all Americans, not merely to provide equal rights
under state law. Section one of the Civil Rights Act supplanted state law
in three important respects. First, it conferred citizenship on all persons
the Nation Anew, supra note 9, at 54.
27. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 474, 599 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson). For
additional authority, see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 897 n.153.
28. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 926.
29. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 599-600 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1294 (Rep. Wil-
son). Nonetheless, opponents warned that the statute could be applied as requiring equality even in
these state-conferred rights by expansive interpretations of the rights to contract and property, and by
virtue of its equal protection provision. See id. at 505 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 606 (Sen. Saulsbury); id.
at 1121 (Rep. Rogers); id. at 1291 (Rep. Bingham). The framers amended the original version of
section one to eliminate a declaration that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights generally "to
quiet the alarm of the opposite party" that it might confer the right to vote, a right the framers
claimed had been delegated by the Constitution to state jurisdiction. Id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall).
30. Id. at 1414 (Sen. Davis). For additional authority, see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitu-
tionalism, supra note 9, at 903-06.
31. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at app. 185 (Sen. Davis).
19891
The Yale Law Journal
born or naturalized in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, except for Indians not taxed. In conferring citizenship Congress
precluded the states from denying citizenship to qualified persons.
Second, it conferred upon all United States citizens the absolute rights
specified. Thus, Senator Trumbull declared:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and
what are they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights which
belong to free citizens or free men in all countries, such as the rights
enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in all the States of
the Union. 2
In other words, the citizen possessed these rights independent of state law.
Senator Trumbull insisted "that the federal government has authority to
make every inhabitant of Pennsylvania a citizen, and clothe him with the
authority to inherit and buy real estate, and the State of Pennsylvania
cannot help it."33 Congressman William Lawrence, a member of the
House Judiciary Committee which was responsible for the civil rights bill
in the House of Representatives, explained section one in the same way:
There are certain absolute rights which pertain to every citizen,
which are inherent, and of which a State cannot constitutionally de-
prive him. But not only are those rights inherent and indestructible,
but the means whereby they may be possessed and enjoyed are
equally so. . . .Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to
live, the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to
acquire and enjoy property. These are rights of citizenship. As nec-
essary incidents of these rights there are others, as the right to make
and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to
share the benefit of laws for the security of person and property. 4
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 conferred these absolute rights of citizen-
ship, and all citizens possessed these rights, in the words of section one,
"any [state] law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding."
Third, in guaranteeing that all United States citizens would enjoy the
enumerated rights and immunities as white citizens enjoyed them, section
one prohibited the states from discriminating on the basis of race in regu-
lating the exercise of these rights. Although the states could no longer
deprive citizens of these rights, the framers intended that the states retain
32. Id. at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 500.
34. Id. at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence); see also id. at 478 (Sen. Saulsbury); id at 1413 (Sens. Van
Winkle and Trumbull); id. at 1759 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson); id. at App. 157




their authority to regulate the exercise and enjoyment of civil rights.35
Section one therefore conferred citizenship and some of the rights of
United States citizenship in a way that permitted the states concurrent
authority to regulate impartially the exercise of these rights.
If the Civil Rights Act had made a blanket grant of the specified rights
to all citizens, the grant would have voided state laws regulating the man-
ner in which they were enjoyed and exercised. State regulations based on
sex, marital status, age, and mental disability, which the framers and legal
authorities on which they relied considered reasonable and legitimate dis-
criminations, would have been abolished if the Civil Rights Act had con-
ferred the right unconditionally."8 The framers wanted to avoid this re-
sult." They succeeded by providing that all citizens shall have the same
enumerated rights "as [are] enjoyed by white citizens." 8 Consequently,
the framers of the Civil Rights Act intended to preserve concurrent state
jurisdiction over civil rights.
II. THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE
LIMITS ON ITS POWERS
The framers' scheme of concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights has
been misinterpreted. Scholars and jurists have incorrectly read into the
35. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 9, at 56.
36. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1835-36 (Rep. Lawrence).
37. Id. at 505 (Sens. Johnson, Trumbull, and Fessenden); id. at 572, 574 (Sen. Henderson); id.
at 573-74 (Sen. Williams); id. at app. 158-59 (Reps. Delano, Wilson, and Niblack); id. at 1832
(Rep. Lawrence).
38. As a New York Evening Post editorial noted:
Congress does not say in this bill by what rules evidence shall be given in courts, by what
tenure property shall be held, or how a citizen shall be protected in his occupation. It only says
to the states, whatever laws you pass in regard to these matters, make them general; make
them for the benefit of one race as well as another.
N.Y. Evening Post (n.d.) (collected in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill 32 (E. McPherson ed., n.d.)
in Edward McPherson Papers (collection available in Library of Congress)). The original version of
section one did not contain the words "as is enjoyed by white citizens." It simply stated that inhabi-
tants of the states shall have the same enumerated rights. This clearly was a grant of absolute rights.
The House amended the bill by changing inhabitants of the states to "citizens of the United States,"
and by adding the clause referring to white citizens. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1115 (Rep.
Wilson). Wilson explained that the change to United States citizens was intended to confine the oper-
ation of the bill "to citizens of the United States, instead of extending it to the inhabitants of the
several states, for there seems to be some doubt concerning the power of Congress to extend this
protection to such inhabitants as are not citizens." The other words were added without a single
comment. Moreover, Senator Trumbull reported that he and the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee regarded the addition of "as is enjoyed by white citizens" as "superfluous." Indeed, he
said:
I do not think they alter the bill. I think the bill would be better without them, but they have
been adopted by the House of Representatives. We did not think they altered the meaning of
the bill; and we did not think it worth-while to send the bill back just because those words
were inserted by the House.
Id. at 1413. Justice White interprets this language in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as "clearly refer[ring] to
rights existing apart from this statute." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 193-94 (1975). If one
assumes that §1981 is equivalent to section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the framers' under-
standing clearly contradicts Justice White's interpretation.
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Civil Rights Act a state action interpretation." Nineteenth century doc-
trines of constitutional law and American federalism strongly suggest that
it is anachronistic to interpret the statute and the debates leading to its
enactment in terms of our understanding of the doctrine of state action.
The framers would not have understood the dichotomy between state ac-
tion and private action as a limitation on Congress' authority to enforce
civil rights as we understand this dichotomy today.
The fugitive slave clause cases are again important because they pro-
vided the framers with their understanding of the scope of Congress' au-
thority to provide remedies for the violation of constitutionally secured
rights. Prigg had held that Congress could compel enforcement of the con-
stitutionally-guaranteed property right of slaveholders only through the
federal courts and only by federal officials. Some question exists whether
the majority held that the states were excluded from enforcing this right."'
The better view appears to be that a majority did not agree with Story
that the authority to enforce that right was exclusively Congress'.41 In any
case, the Court later permitted the states, indirectly and voluntarily, to
assist slave owners in enforcing their constitutionally-secured property
right through the exercise of their police powers. 2 Nonetheless, it reaf-
firmed on the eve of the Civil War the Court's holding in Prigg "that the
Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on
a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform
it."'43 Consequently, Congress' power to enforce and protect constitution-
ally-secured rights did not include the power to compel or to prohibit
state action in regard to such rights. This constitutional doctrine of con-
gressional authority to secure constitutional rights is just the opposite of
the theory of congressional authority to enforce civil rights under the doc-
trine of state action.
This doctrine of congressional remedial authority was the product of
mid-nineteenth century theories of federalism, including dual sovereignty,
sovereign immunity and separation of powers. The Supreme Court ex-
plained dual sovereignty in 1858 as a federal system in which the national
and state governments were distinct sovereignties that acted independently
of one another:
39. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192-214 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. at 449-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 7 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 Part One 1117-1300 (1971); see also
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 69 n.19; Kaczorowski, Searching for
Intent, supra note 9.
40. See R. NEWMEYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 372-78 (1985).
41. Id. at 374-75.
42. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 17-18 (1852). The court recognized concurrent state
authority in another area exclusively delegated to Congress-the interstate commerce power. See Coo-
ley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
43. Kentucky v. Dennison, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 67, 108 (1860).
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[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although
both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet
separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and indepen-
dently of each other, within their respective spheres.""
This notion remained strong through the nineteenth century. The Su-
preme Court emphasized "the distinct and independent character of the
two governments" in 1871:
In their laws, and mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the
other. How their respective laws shall be enacted; how they shall be
carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers;
and how much discretion, or whatever any at all shall be vested in
their officers, are matters subject to their own control, and in the
regulation of which neither can interfere with the other.45
Not only did this mean that Congress could not legislate directly to com-
pel or restrain state action, but also that the courts of one sovereignty were
"far beyond the reach of the other."'46
The doctrine of sovereign immunity reinforced the concept of national
and state governments as independent sovereignties. The general rule of
sovereign immunity in the nineteenth century was that a state could not
be sued unless it consented to be sued.47 This immunity protected state
officers when they were sued in their official capacity for acts committed
under lawful authority.4 However, state immunity did not protect state
officers from suit if the act for which they were being sued was unlawful
or was pursuant to an unconstitutional statute49 and was ministerial in
nature.50 In such cases the act of the state officer was not the act of the
state because the state could not act unlawfully. Consequently, state of-
ficers could only be sued in their capacity as private individuals."'
These rules of sovereign immunity were not a matter of federal comity
alone. Immunity from civil suit largely stemmed from the principle of the
separation of powers.52 Although the actions of the legislative and execu-
44. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858).
45. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407-08 (1871).
46. Riggs v. Johnson, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 195-96 (1867).
47. Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 839 (1824).
48. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828).
49. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 868; Astrom v. Hammond, 2 F. Gas. 71, 72 (C.C.D. Mich. 1842) (No.
596).
50. Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 352 (1868); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 475, 489-90, 498-99 (1866); Board of Comm'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376, 385
(1860); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838); Astrom, 2 F. Gas. at 73.
51. Ex parle Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1907); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 526-27
(1898); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1889); Madrazo, 26 U.S. at 123-24; Osborn, 22 U.S. at
868; T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNrED STATES OF
AMERICA 118-19 (1880).
52. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1882); Gaines, 74 U.S. at 352; Secretary v. Mc-
Garrahan, 72 U.S. (9 Wall.) 298, 312 (1869);Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 498-99; Kendall, 37 U.S.
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tive branches of government were "in proper cases" subject to review by
the courts, neither branch could be compelled or "restrained in its action
by the judicial department."5 The Court elaborated the principle under-
lying this rule in explaining the limited scope of the equitable remedies of
mandamus and injunction in suits against public officials:
An officer to whom public duties are confided by law, is not subject
to the control of the courts in the exercise of the judgment and dis-
cretion which the law reposes on him as a part of his official func-
tions. Certain powers and duties are confided to those officers, and to
them alone, and however the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of
the parties in suits properly before them, pass upon the legality of
their acts, after the matter has once passed beyond their control,
there exists no power in the courts, by any of its processes, to act
upon the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment
while the matter is properly before him for action. The reason for
this is, that the law reposes this discretion in him for that occasion,
and not in the courts.54
Although the case in which this rule was explained involved the power of
the federal courts to compel or restrain the actions of federal executive
officers, the same principles applied to state governmental officers. One
difference, however, was that a federal court could issue the writ of man-
damus to a state officer only to execute a prior judgment of the court and
only to compel a ministerial act by the performance of which alone the
plaintiff's remedy could be effectuated.55 Since the enforcement of most
statutes required an exercise of discretion, rules of sovereign immunity
made injunctive relief unavailable in 1866 as a federal remedy for the
victims of civil rights violations committed by state officers.
Moreover, the general rules of equity virtually eliminated the injunc-
tion as a device to prohibit state officers from violating civil rights,
whether by enforcing discriminatory statutes or by administering state law
in a racially or politically discriminatory manner. As an equitable remedy,
the injunction was available only if there was no adequate remedy at
law.56 In the nineteenth century, final review by the United States Su-
preme Court, as provided for by Congress in section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, was regarded as the normal and adequate remedy to enforce
at 610-11.
53. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 499-500.
54. Gaines, 74 U.S. at 352; accord Astrom, 2 F. Cas. at 73.
55. McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 505 (1813); Kendall, 37 U.S. at 616-17; McGar-
rahan, 76 U.S. at 311-12; Board of Comm'rs, 65 U.S. at 385; Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 166, 188-89, 197-98 (1867).
56. W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN EQuITY 3, 19
(1871). The long-standing requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law before an injunction
will issue reflects the extraordinary nature of the equitable remedy.
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constitutional rights.57 Consequently, injunctive relief would not have
been available to enforce civil rights against state action, because claimants
would not have been able to satisfy the "inadequate remedy at law" re-
quirement. Moreover, the injunction in the nineteenth century was a rem-
edy restricted to the protection of property rights and rights of a pecuniary
nature; it was not available to protect other personal and civil rights."B In
light of these rules, the framers would not have thought injunctions to
restrain state officers from violating civil rights a suitable remedy.
Indeed, noticeably absent from the remedies Congress incorporated into
the Civil Rights Act is injunctive relief, the remedy one would have ex-
pected to find had the framers intended merely to remove legal disabilities
under a state action conception of federal civil rights law. The framers,
bound by stricter rules of federalism, sovereign immunity and equity than
those of today, would not have thought to provide injunctive relief against
the enforcement of discriminatory state action as a remedy for the enforce-
ment of civil rights. Moreover, most civil litigation was suits between pri-
vate parties. Consequently, a party whose civil rights were infringed by
individuals or corporations acting under color of law would sue the indi-
vidual or corporation, not the state.59 It is not surprising, therefore, that
suits against state officers for injunctive relief were rare until the end of
the nineteenth century. Legal treatises written on injunctions and the law
of equity as late as the 1880's gave such actions only cursory attention,
usually in a paragraph with citations to only a few decisions.60 The rules
regarding civil actions against state officials were imprecisely reported, re-
flecting the treatise writers' lack of familiarity with the subject and its
relative unimportance to them. It was not until the 1890's that treatises
gave more than passing attention to the subject."'
57. The Supreme Court held that Congress, in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provided
for final review in the Supreme Court as the normal and adequate remedy for a violation of constitu-
tional rights. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12 (1883). See also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
387 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1879).
58. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 418, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 675 (Ch. 1818); In re Sawyer, 124
U.S. 200, 210 (1887); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1895); Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 325,
33 A. 542, 543 (1896); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 552-53, 64 N.E. 442,
446 (1902); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 130-32, 110 A.2d 383, 387-88 (1955); W. KERR, supra
note 56, at 1; T. COOLEY, supra note 51, at 119; 2 C. BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
INJUNCTIONS 1402 (1895); W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 130 (2d ed. 1956).
59. See, e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (suit by apprentice
against master seeking release from apprenticeship contract that violated her right to equal protec-
tion); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (suit by butchers aginst state chartered
corporation); United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 733 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882) (civil suit and prosecu-
tion of public school teacher for excluding black child from public school); T. COOLEY, supra note 51,
at 118 (although state may not be sued, corporation chartered by state may be sued even when state is
primary stockholder).
60. W. KERR, supra note 56, at 3, 599-600; 1 ABBOrr's UNrrED STATES PRACTICE 222-23
(1871); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 163 (6th ed. 1873); id. at 180 n.4,
260 (13th ed. 1886); T. COOLEY, supra note 51, at 118-19.
61. 2 C. BEACH, JR., supra note 58, at 1402-18; 2 S. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INJUNCTIONS 1321-45 (1905).
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No one in the debates suggested that an injunction was the proper rem-
edy to enforce the rights Congress was attempting to secure. That the
framers did not even consider injunctive relief evinces their understanding
that this writ could not issue from a federal court to enjoin state officials
from violating civil rights. Because established rules of constitutional law
prohibited Congress from compelling state officials to perform federal du-
ties, such as enforcing rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, the framers would have understood that, had they at-
tempted to confer a right to equality in state-conferred rights, citizens
would not have been able to enforce this right directly in federal courts.
The only remedy Congress could have authorized was the indirect remedy
of appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 2 Furthermore, there was
no general federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts until 1875.
Therefore, individuals would not have been able to bring a civil action in
federal court to void discriminatory state statutes or to enjoin their en-
forcement unless Congress expressly conferred the right to do so. Congress
did not confer this remedy. Individuals thus would have been powerless to
enforce their section one rights directly in the federal courts had the Civil
Rights Act merely conferred a right to nondiscriminatory state laws and
legal process.
Moreover, had Congress intended merely to remove legal disabilities in
state law one would expect the statute to have said so clearly, which it
does not. 3 Indeed, had the statute merely conferred a right to equal rights
under state law, the only remedy available in 1866 for its violation would
62. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12 (1883); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1882);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387 (1880). See also cases cited infra note 113.
63. The Fourteenth Amendment expressly prohibits states from infringing the privileges and im-
munities of United States citizens and from denying to all persons due process and equal protection of
the law. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The proposed amendment was adopted by the same Congress
that enacted the Civil Rights Act. However, the prohibitory language of the amendment was not
reported to Congress until April 30, 1866, well after Congress had adopted the statute on March 15
and then enacted it over the President's veto on April 9, 1866. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE
JOINT COMIrrrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRuCFION 303 (1914). Indeed, the Joint Committee did
not even consider such language until April 16. Id. at 294-97. This suggests that Congress was not
thinking exclusively in terms of state action when it framed and adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Congress adopted the prohibitory language of the Fourteenth Amendment to make it self-executing.
See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 914. The amendment is self-
executing in the sense that a party could raise the constitutional claim in a state court, which would
be required to bring state law into conformity with the amendment. However, the framers' under-
standing of constitutional prohibitions against state infringements of fundamental rights was derived
from Prigg v. Pennsylvania which held that such prohibitions against the states constituted an affirm-
ative recognition of absolute rights which delegated to Congress plenary authority to enforce them.
Therefore, constitutional doctrine as the framers understood it suggests that state action interpreta-
tions of the fourteenth amendment are incorrect. Legislation adopted by Congress in 1870 and 1871 to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and the history of civil rights enforcement by the Department of
Justice in the federal courts from 1866 to 1873 show that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were uniformly interpreted by the three branches of the national government as conferring
plenary authority on the government to enforce civil rights. It was not until the Supreme Court's
interpretation of these amendments in 1873 that they were more narrowly interpreted in a federal
court. See R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra
note 9; Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 9.
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have been appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the highest
court of the state. 4 Yet, the framers rejected the insistence of opponents
that a writ of error or certiorari was the proper remedy for the violation
of the constitutional rights they intended to secure."
The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 legislated within these
rules of equity, of constitutional construction, and of sovereign immunity.
These rules indicate that the framers did not think in terms of a state
action limitation on Congress' authority as we understand this constitu-
tional doctrine. It is hence anachronistic to interpret the Civil Rights Act
in terms of our understanding of the doctrine of state action. Constitu-
tional doctrines in 1866 make it unlikely that the framers would have
understood congressionally-enforceable civil rights as a right to equality in
state-conferred rights. Indeed, the doctrines would have led the framers to
believe that Congress was prohibited from legislating directly to compel
state and local officers to enforce, or to refrain from violating, rights se-
cured by the Constitution. The only certain federal remedy for the viola-
tion of a right secured by the Constitution by a state officer's enforcement
of an unconstitutional statute was the indirect and inefficient remedy pro-
vided in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. The framers expressed their intention to provide
more effective remedies by conferring on the federal courts jurisdiction to
administer relief directly rather than by leaving citizens to vindicate their
rights in state courts with final appeal to the United States Supreme
Court."6
III. THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
I have written elsewhere about the Southern conditions that gave rise to
the need for congressional civil rights enforcement.6 7 Congress was well
aware of the need to remedy both those conditions that we would today
regard as state action and those that we would today regard as private
aciton.68 In his piece in this issue, Mr. Sullivan details some of these
conditions."9
Moreover, the framers also were aware of this need, and intended to
64. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 500, 604 (Sen. Cowan).
65. Id. at 603 (Sen. Cowan); id. at 605, 606 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 606 (Sen. Howard); id. at
1151 (Rep. Thornton).
66. Id. at 601 (Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1117-18 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 112! (Rep. Cook); id. at
1153 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1154 (Reps. Eldridge and Thayer); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall); id. at
1266-67 (Rep. Raymond); id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr); id. at 1759 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at app. 158-59
(Rep. Delano).
67. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9.
68. See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1866);
Report of Carl Schurz on the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisi-
ana, S. ExEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
69. Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section
1987, 98 YALE L.J. 541 (1989).
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protect white union loyalists and federal officers in the South. 0 The abro-
gation of racially discriminatory statutes would not have afforded the pro-
tections needed by the freedmen and white unionists from violence perpe-
trated against them with impunity as local- law enforcement officers
refused to prosecute offenders. Nor would this have secured emancipation
as a practical reality by establishing the North's economic system of free
enterprise and free labor based on individual rights, particularly the eco-
nomic rights of contract and property. The primary need of Southern
blacks and white Unionists and federal officers was a federal system of
civil and criminal justice to protect them from civil rights violations re-
gardless of the source.
The most difficult practical problem confronting the framers was how
to secure civil rights in the South. The military's response to these condi-
tions in 1865 and 1866 suggested to Congress the kinds of remedies the
situation demanded. Military commanders viewed the behavior of individ-
ual Southerners illicitly legitimated by state and local authority as an
abuse of law and legal process. They issued orders to subordinates to pro-
tect the freedmen and white Unionists from such oppression. 1 The com-
manders in each state nullified the Black Codes in 1865 and 1866 and
ordered officers to disregard them. 2 The military also suspended civil
suits and criminal prosecutions brought against unpopular whites and
blacks in state courts, and they interposed military authority "to protect
them from any penalties or damages that may have been or may be pro-
nounced or adjudged in said [state] courts in any of such cases."7" In an
obvious attempt to void vagrancy statutes, as well as criminal rape statutes
that imposed different penalties for blacks and whites on the same offense,
military officers were ordered to protect the freedmen "from prosecutions
in any of said States charged with offences for which white persons are
not prosecuted or punished in the same manner and degree."7 4 Military
and Freedmen's Bureau courts were to take jurisdiction of civil and crimi-
nal cases involving those freedmen who were unable to enforce their rights
in state courts, unless federal courts were available.7 The Freedmen's
Bureau was particularly important in helping the freedmen enforce their
70. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 874-77, 897-98; Kaczorow-
ski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 9, at 50-51.
71. See, e.g., General Orders No. 3, Jan. 12, 1866, Adjutant General's Office, reprinted in THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUC-
TION 122-23 (E. McPherson ed. 1875); General Orders No. 7, Mar. 4, 1866, Hdqts., Dep't of South
Carolina, reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1834 (1866).
72. J. SEFTON, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECONSTRUCTION 70-72, 90 (1967); J. Wi.-
LIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 77
(1965).
73. General Orders No. 3, supra note 71, at 123.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., General Orders No. 7, supra note 71.
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contracts, since local law enforcement agencies and courts usually refused
to enforce the freedmen's rights."'
Following the military's example, the framers provided for the enforce-
ment of civil rights directly in the federal courts. They sought to void
racially discriminatory state laws which infringed civil rights secured by
the Constitution, eliminate racial and political prejudice in the adminis-
tration of civil and criminal justice in the State courts, and provide an
alternative system of civil and criminal justice when individuals could not
enforce or were denied their civil rights in the state courts.y
The means the framers adopted to achieve these objectives reflected
their understanding of the legal rules which shaped the remedies they
could provide. Congressmen James Wilson, the floor manager of the Civil
Rights Act in the House of Representatives, summarized these doctrinal
and factual considerations in explaining the statute's provisions for direct
enforcement of civil rights in the federal courts. After quoting -Justice
Story's statement in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that the national government
could compel enforcement of federal duties and constitutional rights only
through the executive department and courts of the United States,7 8 Wil-
son proclaimed that since United States citizens, as such, possessed the
rights to life, liberty, and property, and rights incident thereto including
"the great fundamental rights embraced in the Bill of Rights," they were
entitled to a remedy when these rights were violated."' Referring to Prigg
and other decisions, he said: "That is the doctrine of the law as laid down
by the courts. There can be no dispute about this. The possession of the
rights by the citizen raises by implication the power in Congress to pro-
vide appropriate means for their protection; in other words, to supply the
needed remedy." 0 He asked if a state deprived the citizen of these rights
by preventing him from enforcing these rights through legal process,
have we no power to make him secure in his priceless possessions?
When such a case is presented can we not provide a remedy? Who
will doubt it? Must we wait for the perpetration of the wrong before
acting? Who will affirm this? The power is with us to provide the
necessary protective remedies."1
76. D. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF BLACKS 179-89 (1979).
77. The framers thus provided in law the kinds of relief the military offered under emergency
conditions. The framers stated that they were doing only what the military had been authorized to do
under President Johnson to fend off the objections of Democrats. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at
1759 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1119 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1153 (Rep.
Thayer); id. at 1158, 1160 (Rep. Windom); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall); id. at 1833-35 (Rep.
Lawrence).
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
79. CONG;. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1294 (Rep. Wilson).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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Then, in an explicit rejection of the kind of enforcement scheme that the
doctrine of state action would have required under existing law, Wilson
asked, if Congress did not have the authority to provide the remedies, then
from whom shall they come? From the source interfering with the
right? Not at all. They must be provided by the Government of the
United States, whose duty is to protect the citizen in return for the
allegiance he owes to the Government.82
These comments express an intention to enforce absolute rights of
United States citizenship in national institutions independent of the states,
not a right to equal rights under state law. They show that the framers
believed not only that Congress was restricted to enforcing federal rights
exclusively through the executive and judicial branches of the United
States government but that it also was restricted to enforcing only rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. That the fram-
ers provided for the enforcement of civil rights directly in the federal
courts shows that they believed they were enforcing plenary authority to
protect constitutionally secured rights of United States citizenship.
It is not surprising that the framers did not question Congress' author-
ity to redress wrongs committed by private individuals who violated citi-
zens' civil rights. As Senator Trumbull declared: "The right to punish
persons who violate the laws of the United States cannot be questioned." 3
He expressed the belief that prosecuting community leaders was the most
effective way of stopping the racially and politically motivated civil rights
violations that were endemic to the South during this period:
When it comes to be understood in all parts of the United States that
any person who shall deprive another of any right or subject him to
any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose him-
self to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will soon cease.
I think it will only be necessary to go into the late slaveholding
states and subject to fine and imprisonment one or two in a state,
and the most prominent ones I should hope at that, to break up this
whole business.84
Moreover, the framers' knowledge of federal law and legal process ori-
ented them to provide for the judicial enforcement of the civil rights se-
cured through section one in actions primarily brought by and against
private individuals in the federal courts.85 Civil suits against state and
local officials were rare in the nineteenth century. The model of litigation
82. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson).
83. Id. at 475 (Sen. Trumbull).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 605 (Sen. Trumbull).
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was civil suits brought by and against private parties. Thus, Congressman
Thayer declared that the statute provides for the enforcement of the fun-
damental rights of citizens
through the quiet, dignified, firm, and constitutional forms of judi-
cial procedure. The bill seeks to enforce these rights in the same
manner and with the same sanctions under and by which other laws
of the United States are enforced. It imposes duties upon the judicial
tribunals of the country which require the enforcement of these
rights. It provides for the administration of laws for the enforcement
of these rights.8
Consequently, section two of the Civil Rights Act criminalized violations
of civil rights committed under color of law or custom. Section three con-
ferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce the rights enumerated
in section one.
Criminalizing civil rights violations committed under color of law or
custom was an ingenious way of circumventing four substantial obstacles
to civil rights enforcement in the federal courts. The first obstacle was
how to impose criminal sanctions for violations of civil rights without sup-
planting state and local governments in their ordinary police functions.
The framers expressly intended to preserve state jurisdiction over ordinary
crimes by limiting federal criminal violations of civil rights to those com-
mitted under color of law or custom.87
A second obstacle to effective civil rights enforcement was the cost in-
volved in enforcing civil rights through civil litigation in the federal courts.
This cost would have rendered federal civil remedies a virtual nullity for
those impoverished freedmen who needed them the most. The framers be-
lieved that penal remedies were more effective than civil remedies because
the government would bear the cost of this protection, and because the
deterrent effect of criminal penalties was greater than that of civil dam-
ages. The framers expressed these views in rejecting an amendment to the
Civil Rights Bill that would have substituted civil remedies for the penal
sanctions of section two."8 Congressman Wilson asserted that civil reme-
dies would require the victim to "press his own way through the courts
and pay the bills attendant thereon. This may do for the rich," Wilson
observed, "but to the poor, who need protection, it is a mockery." '89 Civil
damages were inadequate protection for another reason, Wilson declared:
"The citizen can only receive that protection in the form of a few dollars
86. Id. at 1153 (Rep. Thayer). See also id. at 479 (Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 598-99 (Sen. Davis);
id. at 601 (Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr); id. at 1292 (Rep. Bingham).
87. Id. at 1120 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1294 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at app. 158 (Reps. Delano,
Wilson, and Niblack); id. at 1758 (Sen. Trumbull).
88. Id. at 1266 (Rep. Bingham).
89. Id. at 1295 (Rep. Wilson).
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...if he shall be so fortunate as to recover against a solvent wrong-
doer."9 Indignant, he scoffed at the suggestion that civil damages were a
more appropriate remedy for and protection from the violation of civil
rights: "This is called protection. This is what we are asked to do in the
way of enforcing the bill of rights. Dollars are weighed against the right
of life, liberty, and property. Sir, I cannot see the justice of that doc-
trine."'" He insisted "that it is the duty of the Government of the United
States to provide proper protection, and to pay the costs attendant on it." '92
The third obstacle to effective civil rights enforcement was the rules of
sovereign immunity which prevented federal courts from reaching a sig-
nificant source of the violations-state officers, particularly state judges
who failed to dispense justice impartially because they were immune from
civil suit. Thus, Congressman Lawrence observed that one way "of meet-
ing any and every willful deprivation of these rights. . .[is] by action for
damages at common law in the courts, which, however, will not lie against
judicial officers."9" Criminal penalties avoided the rules of sovereign im-
munity and enabled federal courts to make state officers account for their
wrongs when civil suits could not.
Opponents used state sovereign immunity and dual sovereignty to decry
the framers' intention to punish state officials for enforcing state laws.
Congress was condemned for unconstitutionally interfering with and de-
stroying the independence of state governments.94 In defense, Senator
Trumbull admonished the opposition:
The right to punish persons who violate the laws of the United
States cannot be questioned, and the fact that in doing so they acted
under color of law or usage in any locality affords no protection,
.because by the Constitution that instrument and the laws passed in
pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, and every judge,
not only of the United States, but of every State court, is bound
thereby.95
Senator Trumbull's statement suggests the fourth obstacle to effective
civil rights enforcement: the lack of congressional authority to compel state
officials to perform federal duties. Although state officers were bound by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, Congress could not re-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. However, Congress later provided civil damages for violations of civil rights committed
under color of law, a provision patterned on secti6n two. See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13, § 1 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
93. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 1836 (Rep. Lawrence).
94. See id. at 506 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 603 (Sen. Cowan); id. at 1120-22 (Rep. Rogers); id. at
1154 (Rep. Eldridge); id. at 1265-66 (Rep. Davis); id. at 1267 (Rep. Raymond); id. at 1270-71
(Rep. Kerr); id. at 1291 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 12956 (Rep. Latham); id. at 1100 (President John-
son's veto message); id. at app. 182, 183 (Sen. Davis).
95. Id. at 1759 (Sen. Trumbull).
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quire state officers to enforce rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. Thus, Congressman Latham objected to section two
because "it has been long determined that United States laws must be
executed by United States officers."9 The only remedy for the state's vio-
lation of constitutional rights was appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. By criminalizing civil rights violations committed under color of
law, Congress intended to circumvent the rules of sovereign immunity and
the doctrine of dual sovereignty, and to compel state officers to perform
the federal duty of enforcing the civil rights of American citizensY
The framers clearly intended to impose section two criminal sanctions
on state officials who infringed citizens' rights. However, the "'under color
of law or custom" limitation on federal criminal violations of civil rights
was not the equivalent of state action. Inasmuch as the framers under-
stood that private individuals in the South were violating civil rights under
color of law and customs, it is illogical to argue that Congress sought to
limit these sanctions to state officers. Moreover, the framers expressly
stated that they intended to punish anyone who violated the statute, not
just state officials.98 The framers undoubtedly sought to protect blacks
from the abuses of their former masters and employers. In the debates, the
framers identified these abuses as holdovers from the customary practices
in slavery. When they inserted "custom," they meant custom. The framers
also must have intended to protect the freedmen from private individuals
who violated their civil rights under color of law.9 Whenever a land-
owner bought the services of a freedman convicted of vagrancy under dis-
criminatory vagrancy statutes, he acted under color of law. Every time a
landowner refused to sell or rent property to a black in a state in which
blacks were denied this right by law, the landowner deprived a citizen of
his right to property under color of law. Whenever an employer enforced
oppressive and discriminatory terms of an employment contract in the
courts, he acted under color of law. Whenever a former master appren-
ticed his former slaves in apprenticeship contracts under state laws that
withheld from black apprentices the benefits provided white apprentices,
96. Id. at 1296; see also id. at 1292 (Rep. Bingham).
97. Id. at 475-76, 1758-59 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1119 (Reps. Wilson and Loan); id. at 1836,
1837 (Rep. Lawrence). In considering the constitutionality of section two in 1879, the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress could not compel a state officer to perform a federal
duty. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879). However, it interpreted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as conferring on Congress the authority to punish state officers "for neglect cr refusal to perform
the duty required by the act of Congress." Id. Nonetheless, in upholding the indictment of a state
judge for excluding blacks from the grand jury, the Court was careful to insist.that the unlawful act
was a ministerial and not an "official" act. Id. at 348. In their dissent, Justices Field and Clifford
challenged this reasoning. Id. at 353-60.
98. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 1, at 601 (Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1153
(Rep. Thayer); id. at 1156 (Rep. Eldridge); id. at 1156 (Rep. Thornton); id. at 1159 (Rep. Windam);
id. at 1295 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence); id. at App. 183 (Sen. Davis); Kaczorowski,
To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 9, at 63-64.
99. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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the master acted under color of law. Whenever individuals brought vexa-
tious suits or swore out false criminal complaints against white Unionists
and federal officials they acted under color of law. The color of law and
custom limitation on section two's criminal sanctions does not reflect a
state action conception in the minds of the framers. Given the interconnec-
tion between law and custom that deprived blacks and whites of their civil
rights, it is illogical to argue that the framers distinguished between state
action and private action and intended to protect civil rights only against
the former. It is more faithful to the expressed intentions of the framers to
interpret "under color of law and custom" as their ingenious device to
punish criminal civil rights violations committed by private individuals
and public officials in a way that preserved state jurisdiction over ordinary
crimes and that circumvented obstacles to federal civil rights enforcement
presented by dual sovereignty and sovereign immunity."'
Moreover, the framers did not consider it unusual to enforce federal
authority against private individuals; that was the usual way of enforcing
federal law. Rather, what they regarded as extraordinary was requiring
state officers, under threat of criminal prosecution, to enforce federal law,
especially when it conflicted with state law. 01 Yet, they imposed criminal
sanctions and intended those sanctions to be applied against state judges
who disregarded the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.10 2 Therefore, sec-
tion two represents an expansion of federal sanctions for civil rights viola-
tions by adding state officials to private individuals as potential defend-
ants. Next to providing a federal forum to adjudicate cases involving civil
rights directly, this was the most effective way the framers believed they
could nullify discriminatory state statutes and legal processes. They took
this action even though it represented a remarkable breach of federal com-
ity because they felt so strongly about enforcing the civil rights of United
States citizens.
The jurisdictional provisions of section three of the Civil Rights Act
went beyond the criminal sanctions provided in section two. Section three
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the federal district courts over "all
crimes and offences committed against" its provisions. Significantly, it also
conferred concurrent jurisdiction on federal district and circuit courts over
"all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot
enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where
they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section [of the
statute]." Such persons could bring their causes into federal court either
by originating the action in the federal court or by removal from a state
100. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 1, at 475, 1759 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1836 (Rep.
Lawrence).
101. Id. at 1758-59 (Sen. Trumbull).




court. This provision manifests the framers' intention to confer on the
courts of the United States primary civil and criminal jurisdiction over
civil rights in order to enforce these rights in the circumstances that con-
fronted Congress in 1866. The framers authorized the federal courts to
replace state courts, and to try civil and criminal cases that were within
the jurisdiction of the state courts and which state courts otherwise would
have tried, whenever individuals could not enforce their rights in or were
denied their rights by state courts. This is the import of Congressman
Wilson's admonition that, since the states were not protecting the personal
rights of American citizens, "we must do our duty by supplying the pro-
tection which the states deny."1103
In addition to Southern blacks and Union loyalists, the framers re-
sponded to the plight of federal civil and military officials assisting the
freedmen and enforcing federal authority. Section three conferred on civil
and military officers of the United States a right to remove any civil suit
or criminal prosecution commenced against them in any state court for
actions taken to enforce the Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's Bureau
Act.
Section three established a federal system of civil and criminal justice as
an alternative to those of the states when Americans could not enforce or
were denied their civil rights in state courts. Opponents objected that this
provision would transfer from the state courts to the courts of the United
States all civil suits between citizens of a state concerning private transac-
tions and private wrongs."' Indeed, they warned that "every little petty
case of a civil character in which from ten cents to thousands of dollars
are involved" would be absorbed by the federal courts.1" 5 Opponents also
emphasized that section three provided that crimes such as "murder shall
be taken from the jurisdiction and control of the State courts, and that the
district and circuit courts of the United States shall have exclusive juris-
diction of it."106 They predicted "that the whole criminal code of the
State, if the Federal courts can have the power of administering it, will be
administered by the Federal courts and not the State courts.1107 These
103. Id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson); see also id. at 602-03 (Sen. Lane).
104. Id. at 598-99 (Sen. Davis).
105. Id. at 479 (Sen. Saulsbury).
106. Id. Justice Field, with Justice Clifford concurring, declared that federal courts cannot exer-
cise jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions for murder commenced in the courts of the state because
such prosecutions did not arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Rather, such
criminal offences were against the laws of the states whose courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
them. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 336 (1879) (Field, J. concurring). However, the Supreme
Court permitted the removal of state criminal prosecutions when state statutes violated a citizens' right
to the equal protection of the laws in state courts. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312
(1879). Removal was authorized only if the right that was denied or could not be enforced was one
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Dubuclet v. Louisiana, 103 U-1:. 550,
552-53 (1880)
107. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (Sen. Saulsbury); see also id. at 601 (Sen. Hen-
dricks); id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr); id. at 1291-92 (Rep. Bingham).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
enforcement provisions make clear that opponents were not exaggerating
for political effect when they objected that, if Congress possessed the con-
stitutional authority to enact the Civil Rights Act, it could supplant state
civil and criminal codes.108
Proponents, of course, did not wish to supplant state civil and criminal
administration of justice any more than was necessary to meet the emer-
gency that confronted them.109 However, they felt a great need to defend
the revolutionary powers they were extending to the federal courts and
executive officers. They justified this legislation by insisting that they
were merely providing through civil and criminal process the relief that
the Union army was offering under military powers.110 The need they felt
to justify this enormous intrusion on state jurisdiction also explains the
emphasis they placed on the enactment of racially discriminatory state
laws and law enforcement as conclusive evidence of the need for federal
civil rights protection."11
There were seven additional enforcement provisions, most of which
were taken from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which granted broad
powers to the executive and judicial branches of the national government.
Sections four and five required United States attorneys, marshals, com-
missioners, and any other officers appointed by the President to arrest and
prosecute all persons who violated the statute. Section six provided crimi-
nal penalties against anyone who interfered with the enforcement of the
Civil Rights Act. Section nine authorized the President "to employ such
part of the land or naval forces of the United States or of the militia, as
shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution
of this act." Section ten authorized final appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court of all questions of law arising in any cause under the act.
The enforcement provisions demonstrate the framers' understanding
that they were enforcing absolute rights secured by the United States Con-
108. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 903-09. Section three
also authorizes the federal courts, whenever federal statutes are inadequate, "to furnish suitable reme-
dies and punish offences against the law," and to extend "the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court ... is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States." This was interpreted in the debates
as authorizing a federal common law. Cong. Globe, supra note 1, at 1271 (Rep. Latham). This seems
to be the clear meaning, especially in light of the development of federal common law that was occur-
ing in other areas of law. See T. FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE Swift and Erie Cases in
American Federalism (1981).
109. Cong. Globe, supra note 1, at 1837 (Rep. Lawrence).
110. Id. at 603 (Sen. Wilson); id. at 1119 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1123-24 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1153
(Rep. Thayer); id. at 1158, 1160 (Rep. Windom); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall); id. at 1759 (Sen.
Trumbull); id. at 1833-35 (Rep. Lawrence).
111. Id. at 602-03 (Sen. Lane); id. at 603 (Sen. Wilson); id. at 605, 1759 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at
1117-18, 1294 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124-25 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1155 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1263-65
(Rep. Broomall); id. at 1266-67 (Rep. Raymond). Although the framers contemplated federal courts
exercising original and removal jurisdiction over civil rights cases when state statutes and judicial
process did not permit persons to enforce their rights, with the grant of federal question jurisdiction in
1875, federal courts would have sufficient jurisdiction to enforce section one rights even if section three
jurisdiction was interpreted as requiring discriminatory state action.
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stitution and not simply an equality in state-conferred rights. This conclu-
sion is further demonstrated by the statute's enforcement provisions taken
from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which also was enacted to enforce
constitutionally protected "rights of Americans, the rights of slaveholders
in their slaves."112 The jurisdiction Congress conferred on the federal
courts to enforce civil rights directly evinces the framers' intention to ap-
ply its authority beyond the removal of legal disabilities. Congress could
confer this jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce civil rights only if
the framers believed that Congress had authority to enforce the rights
themselves. If the statute had only removed legal disabilities in state law
by prohibiting racially discriminatory state laws regarding state-conferred
rights or by conferring a right to racially impartial state laws relating to
state-conferred rights, Congress could not have conferred on United States
courts section three jurisdiction to try civil actions between private parties
and criminal cases. 1 3 This conclusion is inescapable in light of prevailing
constitutional doctrine of the framers' era which held that the remedy was
coextensive with the right conferred.'14 Moreover, a statute limited to re-
moving the legal disabilities of blacks would not have afforded protection
to the civil rights of whites, and the framers clearly expressed their under-
standing of the Civil Rights Act as giving whites the same protection as
blacks.115 It is simply illogical to interpret section one as merely removing
legal disabilities when section two criminalizes certain violations of section
one rights, section three confers on federal courts primary civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over cases involving these rights, and other provisions
called on the executive officers and the armed forces of the United States
112. Id. at 476, 605, 606, 1757 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 500 (Sen. Stewart); id. at 601 (Sen.
Hendricks); id. at 602 (Sen. Lane); id. at 603-04 (Sen. Cowan); id. at 605, 606 (Sens. Norton and
Trumbull); id. at 1118-19, 1295 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 158-59 (Rep. Windom); id. at 1296 (Rep.
Latham).
113. This conclusion follows from the prevailing doctrine of dual sovereignty. The Court held that
rights granted and secured by the states and duties imposed by state law could not be enforced directly
in the federal courts, either by civil action or by criminal sanctions. Congress could enforce directly
only rights secured and duties imposed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387-89 (1879); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 409-11 (1879); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658-65 (1884); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1884); United
States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459); Cully v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,
6 F. Cas. 946 (D.C.D. Md. 1876) (No. 3,466); In re Mahon, 34 F. 528 (1888).
114. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (13 Wall.) 36, 76-81 (1873); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-57 (1875); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-15 (1883).
115. Cong. Globe, supra note 1, at 474, 599 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson). For
*additional authority, see Kaczorowski, Revolutiona7y Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 897 n.153.
The framers' intention to enforce the civil rights of Southern white unionists reflects details of the
historical context of the statute peculiar to the era of the Civil War and reconstruction. Although the
framers understood the need and intended to protect blacks, as blacks, from racial discrimination, they
did not intend to protect whites, as whites. Rather, they understood that the need to protect whites
arose from their association with the Union cause and loyalty to the United States government to
political loyalists or as federal officials. Because these conditions no longer exist, it is difficult to
imagine the Civil Rights Act being applied to protect whites today in any way other than as victims of
racial discrimination as the Court has done in St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022
(1987) and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
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to enforce the Civil Rights Act. The historical context of this legislation,
the legal theories on which it was grounded, and its very provisions con-
clusively demonstrate that Congress intended to enforce civil rights
whether the violation was the act of a private individual, a state official or
a state statute. The ambiguity in the scope of the Civil Rights Act is the
product of subsequent misintepretation of the statute's legislative history
based on modern doctrines that have no applicability in determining the
framers' intent.1 16
IV. How WE GOT HERE FROM THERE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
(MIS)INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
I have shown elsewhere that federal judges and legal officers who were
given the responsibility of implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on
its enactment into law, as well as state appellate judges, uniformly inter-
preted and enforced it in a manner that reflected the interpretation argued
in this Comment.1 Space permits us only a very brief look at the way in
which the United States Supreme Court essentially rewrote the Act over
the first half-century after its enactment. We can trace three key threads
through this period: the reading of a state action limitation into the Civil
Rights Act, the transformation of the doctrine of dual sovereignty, and the
abandonment of the Hamiltonian theory of congressional power to enforce
constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Acts in 1872.1 The issue in the case was whether black victims of
crimes committed by whites were persons affected by the prosecution for
purposes of federal court jurisdiction under section three. Although the
Court held that they were not because the only persons so affected are the
defendant and the state, and thus eliminated federal jurisdiction to try
white defendants for crimes against blacks, it upheld the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act and interpreted it broadly in other respects. The
Supreme Court appealed to the legislative history of the statute and de-
clared that it was "well known" that the Civil Rights Act was intended to
protect blacks from "prejudices [that] existed against the colored race,
which naturally affected the administration of justice in the State courts,
116. In his dissent in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Justice Harlan in-
sisted that the quotations from the legislative debates used by the majority as evidence of the framers'
intent to protect civil rights from private discrimination "are by no means contrary to a 'state action'
view of the civil rights bill." Id. at 471. He, of course, was insisting upon a state action interpretation
of the statute. Justice Harlan's view is untenable in light of the nature of the civil rights violations
Congress was attempting to remedy, the legal doctrines that shaped their understanding of the reme-
dies Congress could provide to counteract these violations, and the enforcement provisioris they actu-
ally adopted.
117. R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 1-12; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,
supra note 9, at 900-03, 907-09; Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 9, at 56-62.
118. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
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and operated harshly when one of that race was a party accused."'1 9 The
Court also interpreted the statute as conferring the rights enumerated in
section one, not simply as removing legal disabilities, but as securing the
civil rights of whites as well as blacks when it declared that the Civil
Rights Act "extends to both races the same rights, and the same means of
vindicating them."12
The Slaughter-House Cases12 ' and United States v. Cruikshank,'122
however, began unraveling this interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. In
his majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller rejected
Congress; theory of United States citizenship and congressionally-
enforceable rights and declared that the natural rights to life, liberty and
property and the civil rights incident thereto were rights of state citizen-
ship and therefore enforceable exclusively by the states.' The rights se-
cured to United States citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment were rela-
tively minimal rights such as the right to protection while in a "foreign
country, the right to use the navigable waterways of the United States, the
right to interstate travel, and the right to petition Congress for the redress
of grievances." The Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as a
guarantee against the reinstitution of slavery.'25
In Cruikshank, decided three years later, the Court affirmed this inter-
pretation of citizenship and held that the authority and duty to protect the
inalienable rights of citizenship were exclusively within state sover-
eignty. 1' The Court expressly excluded any consideration of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and discussed national civil rights enforcement author-
ity as if it were wholly contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court held that, as the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from
denying the equal protection of the laws, "[tihe only obligation resting
upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This
119. Id. at 593.
120. Id. Federal judges, United States attorneys general and United States attorneys, along with
Congress, consistently interpreted the scope of federal authority to enforce civil rights under the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Enforcement Act of 1870
and the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871 as plenary authority to redress civil rights violations regardless of
the source of the infringement. See R. KAcZOROWSKI, supra note 6. The federal courts and the
Department of Justice virtually administered criminal justice in areas of the South where the Klan
and similar organizations overwhelmed local law enforcement officers and institutions. Federal judges
without exception upheld the constitutionality of those civil rights statutes and enforced them to prose-
.cute private individuals as well as state officials. Federal judges did not acknowledge a state action
limitation on national civil rights enforcement authority until the Supreme Court's decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases.
121. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
122. 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 553 (1875).
123. 83 U.S. at 75-78.
124. Id. at 79-80.
125. Id. at 69-70.
126. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 553 (1875).
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the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national gov-
ernment is limited to the enforcement of this guarantee.1
12 7
The Court then proceeded, in Virginia v. Rives, to graft its state action
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment onto the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Acknowledging that the statute was enacted prior to the certification
of the amendment, the Court nonetheless declared that it was re-enacted
"upon the first section of that amendment." 2 Overlooking or ignoring its
earlier comment that it was well known that Congress intended section
three to protect blacks from racial prejudice in the administration of jus-
tice,129 the Court stated that the removal provisions of section three were
limited, as was the Fourteenth Amendment, to racially discriminatory
state action. Furthermore, sovereign immunity doctrine prompted the
Court to hold that racially discriminatory action by a state officer was not
the act of the state if the officer was acting beyond his power under state
law.130 Therefore, removal was available only before trial, and only when
the state constitution or law was racially discriminatory. The Court de-
clared that the exclusive remedy for the violations of civil rights committed
by state judges and executive officers was review and correction by the
Supreme Court."3 Only in 1907 did the Court change the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity in a way that permitted suits against state of-
ficers under a theory of state action.13 2
The companion case of Strauder v. West Virginia, which presented a
racially discriminatory law, created a contradiction in the Court's doc-
trine. The Court interpreted section three of the Civil Rights Act to allow
removal of a case to federal court where state law excluded blacks from
serving on grand and petit juries. The Act granted the right to remove
whenever "any rights secured to [persons] by any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States" was denied by state
law. 33 Accordingly, the Court had to hold that the state law interfered
with rights pertaining to federal citizenship. In contrast to its holdings in
Slaughter-House and Cruikshank that the Fourteenth Amendment se-
cured a right to racially impartial state law, the Court now held that the
amendment implied "the existence of rights and immunities, prominent
among which is an immunity from inequality of legal protection, either
127. Id. at 555.
128. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 333 (1879).
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130. Rives, 100 U.S. at 334.
131. Id. at 321-22; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387 (1880).
132. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-60 (1907).
133. Id. at 311. In other cases the Court held that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to try
cases involving rights that were secured by the states. Dubuclet v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 550, 552-53
(1880) (right to vote and hold state office); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1884) (right to
pay state taxes with interest coupons granted by the state). But see United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882) (federal jurisdiction under section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to punish
public school teacher for racial discrimination under state law).
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for life, liberty, or property." The Civil Rights Act, the Court held, "par-
tially enumerat[es] the rights and immunities intended to be guaranteed by
the Constitution."
The Court resolved this contradiction in the Civil Rights Cases in
1883.134 It interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as "prohibitory in its
character, and prohibitory upon the States. ' 135 Moreover, the amendment
"invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation," the
Court declared, and then asked, "To enforce what?" It answered: "To
enforce the prohibition." ' The Court elaborated:
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but they are secured by way of prohibition
against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the pur-
pose of carrying such prohibition into effect: and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or
State proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation
and effect.13 7
The Court identified as the positive rights the amendment was intended to
secure "the rights to life, liberty and property (which includes all civil
rights which men have). ' 13' Although the Court declared that these natu-
ral rights were secured by the Constitution, it nevertheless insisted that
this constitutional guarantee did not delegate to Congress the power to
legislate generally regarding them, and therefore to enforce them against
private individuals.
The Court thus abandoned the Hamiltonian theory of constitutional in-
terpretation and transformed the established doctrine of dual sovereignty
exemplified by such cases as McCulloch v. Maryland and Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania. Instead of interpreting the negative prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment as constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights that
delegated to Congress plenary authority to enforce civil rights, it allowed
Congress only to enforce the prohibitions by intervening when state action
violated them. The Court's explanation echoed the Congressional Demo-
crat's opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1866: Plenary civil rights au-
thority would enable Congress "to establish a code of municipal law regu-
lative of all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to
make Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to supercede
-them."""3 The Court was unwilling to concede this power to Congress.
134. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 11-12.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 13. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text for the views of congressional
Democrats.
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Nonetheless, the Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment to give
Congress this authority. The Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished
slavery; it also "established universal freedom."14 Because the amend-
ment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws," it delegated to Congress
authority to enact remedial legislation that was "primary and direct in its
character," "operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by
State law or not. ' 141 The Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act as in-
tended "to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without re-
gard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence
of civil freedom." 42 Nevertheless, the Court repeated its view that the
statute was re-enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded
that "This law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract
and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings and customs hav-
ing the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified." '143
Having interpreted one constitutional amendment as limiting Congress
to reaching state action and one as not having such a limitation, the Court
limited the Civil Rights Act's coverage to state action. It reasoned that
Congress re-enacted the statute in 1870 under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it read back into Congress the Court's state action interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ignored the fact that the
legislation that re-enacted the Civil Rights Act contained provisions en-
forcing civil rights against private individuals, as did the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871."' These statutes show that Congress clearly did not legislate
in 1870 and 1871 within a state action interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, the Court ignored the intention of the original
framers. Using its method of divining legislative intent, the Court should
have found no state action limitations in the intent of the framers because
the Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as delegating sufficient
authority to secure the absolute rights of free citizens, and it was under
the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment as the Court interpreted it
that the framers adopted the Civil Rights Act. This was a remarkable
piece of judicial legislation in which the Court chose narrower guarantees
or rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States than
were available even under its interpretation of the Constitution. This in-
terpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment permits the Court today to cor-
rect this aberrant judicial construction of the Civil Rights Act.
140. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
141. Id. at 20, 23.
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 16.




The Supreme Court effectively curtailed civil rights enforcement in the
nineteenth century by reading into federal civil rights provisions restricted
meanings not intended or even considered by their framers. The Court's
interpretation of federal guarantees of civil rights is starkly contrasted
with its earlier enforcement of slave owners' property rights in their slaves
under the fugitive slave clause. In assessing the scope of protection offered
by this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court laid down a rule of
constitutional interpretation:
How, then, are we to interpret the language of this clause? The true
answer is, in such a manner, as, consistently with the words, shall
fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it. If by one
mode of interpretation the right must become shadowy and unsub-
stantial, and without any remedial power adequate to the end, and
by another mode it will attain its just end and secure its manifest
purpose, it would seem, upon principles of reasoning, absolutely ir-
resistible, that the latter ought to prevail. No Court of justice can be
authorized so to construe any clause of the Constitution as to defeat
its obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with
the words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them.14
The same principles should apply to statutory construction. In this con-
text, the question that the Supreme Court unwittingly raised in Patterson
is one that Senator Trumbull and his legislative colleagues thought they
had answered in 1866: whether they had "enact[ed] a law as efficient in
the interest of freedom, now that freedom prevails throughout the country,
as we had in the interest of slavery when it prevailed in a portion of the
country. 146
145. Prigg %. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842).
146. Cong. Globe, supra note 1, at 475 (Sen. Trumbull).
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